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Abstract—Phishing is a prevalent issue of today’s Internet.
Previous approaches to counter phishing do not draw on a crucial
factor to combat the threat - the users themselves. We believe
user education about the dangers of the Internet is a further
key strategy to combat phishing. For this reason, we developed
an Android app, a game called –NoPhish–, which educates the
user in the detection of phishing URLs. It is crucial to evaluate
NoPhish with respect to its effectiveness and the users’ knowledge
retention. Therefore, we conducted a lab study as well as a
retention study (five months later). The outcomes of the studies
show that NoPhish helps users make better decisions with regard
to the legitimacy of URLs immediately after playing NoPhish as
well as after some time has passed. The focus of this paper is on
the description and the evaluation of both studies. This includes
findings regarding those types of URLs that are most difficult to
decide on as well as ideas to further improve NoPhish.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scammers discover the Internet as a convenient place for
their criminal activities. They send Internet users spoofed
messages which link to fraudulent but legitimate looking
websites. These websites prompt visitors to enter confidential
data such as login or banking credentials. This kind of Internet
fraud is referred to as phishing. There exist multiple technical
approaches to counter phishing, e.g. identifying phishing mes-
sages resp. websites (URLs) and adding them to blacklists [1],
[2], [3], [4]. Generally, in case a message or URL is blacklisted
users are warned e.g. by their email clients or Web browsers.
Yet, blacklists cannot guarantee sufficient protection since it
takes some time to detect phishing messages/URLs and update
the blacklists (according to [5] the average up-time of phishing
websites was 32 hours and 32 minutes in the first half of 2014).
In this time span users need to be self-reliant and protect
themselves against phishing. Moreover, due to the lack of
knowledge about phishing and its consequences such warnings
(like security warnings in general) are likely to be ignored [6],
[7].
For these reasons, a complementary approach is required:
user education that makes people aware of phishing, of being
a potential victim, and that explains them how to detect
phishing URLs (in general and particularly in mobile Web
browsers). In particular, users need to learn how to spot URL
spoofing tricks phishers exploit to deceive their victims and
lure them into disclosing their information on a phishing
website. We developed an Android app, a game called –
NoPhish–, to teach exactly these issues with the aid of well
known learning theories such as practice and repetition. The
underlying concepts were proposed and discussed in [8].
The aim of this paper is to report about the findings from
our effort to evaluate NoPhish with respect to its effective-
ness and usability. For the evaluation, we conducted a lab
study in which we first tested participants’ ability to identify
phishing websites, then they played NoPhish and were tested
immediately afterwards again. In addition – and different from
earlier research on security education – we conducted an
online study five months later. We conducted a retention study
because we are convinced that the retention of knowledge is
the most crucial part of security education. People do not need
to apply their security knowledge frequently, but only in the
case of potentially being attacked (in this case receiving a
phishing message or visiting a phishing website). In addition,
we could show that participants learning with NoPhish were
significantly better in making proper decisions regarding the
legitimacy of URLs both immediately after using the app and
after some time has passed. However, we also noticed that a
letter swapping based URL spoofing trick (e.g. mircosoft.com)
would still be rather successful. Thus, it remains important
for companies to search actively for such domains and either
make sure they are blacklisted or redirected to the proper
domain (as it is actually the case for mircosoft.com). We also
found that some participants who were able to detect phish-
ing URLs that contained the brand name in the subdomain
(amazon.shopping.com) immediately after playing the game,
missed them in the retention study. Therefore, we conclude
that it is important to emphasize more on this type of trick in
a future version of NoPhish.
II. NoPhish - GAME DESIGN
Before elaborating on our studies to evaluate NoPhish we
briefly describe the game itself. We applied several learning
principles [9], such as exercise, repetition, and direct feedback
to optimize learning performance. Gamification elements like
lives and levels1 were also implemented to increase motiva-
tion. We followed a user-centered design [10] and involved
potential users in the development process. NoPhish entails an
awareness part and the actual gaming part which are described
in the following subsections.
A. Awareness Part
Users are made aware of how simple it is to spoof messages
by enabling them to send themselves an email from a sender
1http://badgeville.com/wiki/Game Mechanics Accessed November 26 2014
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address they provide and with content they provide. Note, this
email contains – by default – an explanation that it was sent
using the NoPhish app to avoid misuse of this functionality.
Users are made aware that they should not trust links in
messages by providing them with an email that asks them to
click on a link displaying ’www.google.com’ while clicking on
the link leads them back to the app. Finally, the users are made
aware that a legitimate looking website does not necessarily
mean that it is legitimate by showing them twice the same
website (body) but with different URLs in the address bar.
B. Gaming Part
The gaming part is split into eight levels with increasing
difficulty. Each level consists of two parts: an introductory
block and the actual exercise. The exercise is designed in a
playful manner, i.e. users start with three lives, represented
by hearts, and can collect points for correct answers and lose
points and lives for wrong ones. Users receive direct feedback
on their decisions. If the given answer is correct the users
are rewarded by gaining points and a smiley face. If the
answer is wrong the users lose points and a life. The users
are immediately told why their answer was wrong. The next
level is achieved if and only if a predefined amount of phishing
and legitimate URLs has correctly been identified. The current
level also contains exercises from previous levels to repeat
those again and again. Figure 1 depicts exemplary screenshots
for the introductory and the exercise part. In the following, the
learning content of each level is summarized.
Fig. 1: Screenshot introductory part (left), exercise part (right)
Level 1 - Structure of a URL: Phishers apply different
URL spoofing tricks to deceive their victims and lure them
into disclosing their data. In this level people achieve the
capability of parsing a URL properly as this is a precondition
to identify different URL spoofing tricks. Especially, people
learn to identify the domain (first- and second-level) in a given
URL. As the use of technical terms is avoided, this part of the
URL is referred to as Who-Section. During the exercise, the
user is asked to tap on the Who-Section.
Levels 2-8 - URL Spoofing Tricks: In the introductory parts
of levels 2-8 existing URL spoofing tricks (based on literature
such as [11], [12] and the analysis of PhishTank URLs) are
addressed while starting with simple ones that are often applied
according to [12] and continuing with more difficult ones:
• Level 2: subdomain tricks with very obvious domain
names (e.g. amazon.phishing.com)
• Level 3: IP address tricks (e.g. 5.178.64.164/test)
• Level 4: subdomain tricks with random domain names
(e.g. paypal.mayponyfarm.com/)
• Level 5: subdomain tricks with trustworthy sounding
or related domain names (e.g. amazon.shopping.com
or amazon.secure-login.com)
• Level 6: tricks where the domain name contains some
form of the targeted brand name, i.e. either introducing
typos (e.g. twpitter.com), swapping letters (e.g. mir-
cosoft.com) or using similar/deceptive domains (e.g.
facebook-login.com)
• Level 7: tricks where a character of the domain name
is substituted by another (or several) similar looking
character(s) (e.g. arnazon.com or paypa1.com)
• Level 8: tricks where the host/brand name ap-
pears in the path part of the URL (e.g. auc-
tion.org/www.ebay.com)
In the exercise part of the corresponding levels, the user
is asked to decide whether the displayed URL a is legitimate
or a phishing URL. Every time the user correctly identifies
a phishing URL, NoPhish asks the user to tap on the Who-
Section. This way, we aspire to ensure that the user understood
where to look at and did not just guess the answer. If the user
cannot identify the Who-Section the answer to this exercise is
considered wrong. Whenever the user gives a wrong answer
he receives direct feedback on why the given answer is
wrong. The displayed URLs are generated on the fly based
on a predefined set of legitimate domains, subdomains, and
paths. These were selected from the top Alexa domains for
Germany2. Spoofing tricks are then applied to these legitimate
URLs to get the phishing URLs whenever required. Note that
the selection of URLs in NoPhish is randomized. For more
details about NoPhish we refer to [8]3.
III. LAB STUDY
We conducted a lab and an online retention study to inves-
tigate the effectiveness and usability of NoPhish. This section
describes the hypotheses, gives insights to our participant
recruitment, compensation and ethics, explains the design of
the lab study and states the results of the lab study. The next
section then deals with the results of the online retention study.
A. Hypotheses
We formulated the following hypotheses to evaluate the
effectiveness and usability of NoPhish:
Hypothesis 1 - Correct Answers: After playing NoPhish,
the participants give significantly more correct answers when
deciding whether or not a website (i.e. the legitimate content
and either the legitimate or a spoofed URL in the address bar)
is a phishing website than before playing NoPhish.
2The app is currently only available in German. Both studies were run with
Germans in German and screenshots were translated for this paper.
3Note, [8] has been published after having analyzed the lab study. While
we do not report there about the lab study, we present an improved version
of NoPhish in [8] – improved based on the results from the lab study.
Correspondingly, the levels slightly differ in [8] from what is described here.
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Hypothesis 2 - URL Based Decision: After playing
NoPhish, the participants primarily base their decision whether
or not a website is a phishing website significantly more often
on the URL.
Hypothesis 3 - URL Comprehension: After playing
NoPhish the participants primarily base their decision whether
or not a website is a phishing website significantly more often
on the domain of a URL.
Hypothesis 4 - Good Usability: The usability of NoPhish is
above average. An SUS score higher than 68 can be considered
above average usability.
B. Participant Recruitment, Compensation and Ethics
We used several channels to reach potential participants
including flyers distributed in town and online social networks.
Those we reached were asked to further advertise the study to
get more participants via a snowball approach. Note, when
advertising the study, we did not mention the specific topic
of phishing in advance because we did not want potential
participants to read up about it before the lab study.
People participated in groups of four to five people. The
participant who performed best was awarded with a “Golden
Anti-Phish Certificate”, all other participants received a “Silver
Anti-Phish Certificate”. For each group a gift certificate was
raffled. To express our appreciation to each participant we
offered cookies and other kinds of sweets. The participants
were informed that there will be a further gift-certificate raffle
for the retention study.
The requirements for research that involves humans are set
by the university’s ethics commission4. These requirements are
met in our study: at the beginning of the study the participants
were explained about the purpose of the study and that they
were not obliged to finish it. If they wanted to leave the study
before the end, however, they could not be included to the
gift certificate raffle. The participants were handed out consent
forms with experimental guidelines and with information about
the data stored anonymously.
C. Study Design
For the lab study we chose a within-subject design, i.e.
a “before and after NoPhish” study with the same group of
people. People participated in the lab study in groups of four
to five people because we wanted to add a motivational game
element: the participant who performed best was awarded with
a “Golden Anti-Phish Certificate”. In the following, we dwell
on the different steps of the lab study.
(1) Informed Consent: Before starting the lab study the
participants were asked to sign the informed consent form.
(2) Website-Survey Before: In this part of the lab study,
each participant got 165 printed screenshots of websites, all
with legitimate content but eight with phishing URLs and
eight with legitimate URLs. The screenshots had been taken
with the standard browser of an Android tablet instead of
a smartphone due to the small size of a smartphone. When
4http://www.intern.tu-darmstadt.de/gremien/ethikkommisson/index.en.jsp
5Note, all participants got the same screenshots.
choosing a phishing URL we took care that each spoofing
trick (cf. subsection II-B) was represented at least once in
this survey. Participants were asked to decide whether or not
they would enter confidential data on the shown website.
Additionally, for each screenshot they were asked to encircle
the part of the screenshot which was the primary reason for
their decision. Furthermore, participants were asked to indicate
how confident they were about each answer on a five-point
Likert scale. Finally, they were asked for each brand used in
a screenshot whether or not they knew the brand and had an
account there.
(3) Play NoPhish: At this stage, participants got smart-
phones and had 30 minutes to play NoPhish. While playing,
the participants were handed out a slip of paper for taking
notes. Note that we did not ask the participants to write down
anything specific. Afterwards, we collected the smartphones
and noted down the achieved points for each level.
(4) Website-Survey After: After playing NoPhish, the par-
ticipants got a second survey. This survey contained all screen-
shots of the previous survey. Moreover, it contained eight new
website screenshots, four with a phishing URL and the other
four with the respective legitimate URL.
(5) General-Survey After: In this step, participants were
asked to complete some demographic questions. This form also
contained questions to compute the System Usability Scale
(SUS) [13] as well as questions regarding the participants’
impression and opinion of NoPhish.
(6) Certificates and Debriefing: Once they had completed
the final survey, we thanked the participants and awarded
the “Golden Anti-Phish Certificate” and “Silver Anti-Phish
Certificates”. Next, the gift certificate was raffled. Finally, there
was an optional debriefing, where the participants could ask
questions or provide their remarks in person.
D. Results for Hypotheses
In total 23 participants attended the lab study6. We report
here only about those 19 participants who additionally took
part in the follow-up retention study.
Demographics: We had six male and 13 female partici-
pants. The age of our participants ranged from 20 to 36. Their
field of work resp. studies is quite diverse. Three of the 19
participants work/study in the area of electrical engineering
or IT. The rest of them work or study in other fields such as
economics, finances or architecture.
Measurements: The hypotheses were tested with the aid of
the participants’ answers and markings. In particular, we tested
hypothesis 1 with the aid of the participants’ answers whether
or not they would provide their information on a specific
website (we considered the percentage of correct answers
for each participant). An answer was considered correct if a
phishing website was correctly identified as phishing (i.e. the
participant would not provide any data) and if a legitimate web-
site was correctly identified as legitimate. All other answers
were considered wrong. As we also asked the participants to
mark the source of their decision we could test hypothesis 2
correspondingly. Each marking involving any part of the URL
6Note, in one group one participant did not show up.
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was counted as a URL marking (rather than e.g. content
markings). Note that favicons, padlocks or the Web browser
tab were not coded as URL markings. Markings involving the
domain or parts of the domain (e.g. the position of a typo)
were counted as domain markings and used for hypothesis 3.
Finally, we calculated the usability score of NoPhish with the
aid of the SUS [13]. An SUS score higher than 68 can be
considered above average usability.
Hypotheses 1-3 were tested with the two-tailed Wilcoxon
signed-rank test [14] comparing answers from the survey
before playing NoPhish and answers from the survey after
playing NoPhish. Table I summarizes the ranks of each hypoth-
esis which we discuss in detail in the following paragraphs.
Note, H1a in Table I addresses possible recognition effects
relevant for H1. H1a only considers new screenshots from the
after survey and compares them against the ones in the survey
before.
TABLE I: Ranks of hypotheses 1-3
Hypothesis H1 H1a H2 H3
Negative rank 0 0 0 0
Positive rank 19 19 19 18
Binding 0 0 0 1
Total 19 19 19 19
Hypothesis 1: Figure 2 shows the results of both surveys
with respect to correct answers. The majority of the partici-
pants identified more URLs correctly after playing NoPhish
than before. While most participants correctly identified eight
to ten out of 16 (50-64%) websites before they played
NoPhish, almost everyone gave correct answers to at least 22
out of 24 (90% and higher) websites afterwards.
Fig. 2: Correct answers before and after NoPhish
Table I shows that hypothesis 1 only reveals positive
ranks, i.e. each participant gave more correct answers (in per-
cent) compared to the survey before. Applying the two-tailed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test we found out that the group survey
before and the group survey after differ significantly with a p-
value of 0.001 in their median of correctly answered questions.
The test shows the survey after group gave significantly more
correct answers compared to the survey before group. Thus,
this result supports our hypothesis 1.
One could argue that this increase in correct answers is
based on the fact that the examples are mainly the same in
the survey after, i.e. the reason for the participants’ improved
performance is based on recognition effects. Thus, we addi-
tionally applied the test while comparing the percentage of
correct answers wrt. new URLs of the survey after with the
ones of the survey before. Column H1a of Table I contains the
ranks for this test. The negative rank of zero indicates that no
participant performed worse considering the new screenshots
during the survey after compared to the screenshots of the
survey before. All participants performed better (positive rank
of 19). Applying the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test
indicates that the survey after group with new screenshots
differs significantly from the survey before group with a p-
value of 0.001. The survey after group with new screenshots
gives significantly more correct answers than the survey before
group. Thus, recognition effects can be neglected.
Hypothesis 2: Figure 3 shows how many participants
marked URLs as their main source of decision. Most of the
participants already based most of their decisions on the URL
before playing NoPhish. E.g. seven participants based their
decision on the URL in 90-94% of the screenshots and another
five participants based their decision on the URL in even 95-
100% of the cases. In the before survey, we identified 35
markings for the content of the website or the padlock (out
of 303 markings). After playing NoPhish the website content
was marked only once, none marked the padlock7.
Comparing the before and after survey with respect to
URL markings we can observe that five participants (approx.
26%) always marked the URL in the survey before playing
NoPhish (note that Figure 3 indicates the span of 95-100%,
but in fact all five participants always marked the URL, i.e.
in 100% of the cases). After playing, 15 participants (approx.
79%) always based their decision on the URLs, one participant
based his decision on the URL only 55-59% of the cases and
the remaining three participants made an exception only once
or twice. Table I shows that hypothesis 2 only reveals positive
ranks, i.e. each participant marked the URL more often after
playing NoPhish compared to the survey before. Applying the
two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test we found that the group
survey before and the group survey after differ significantly
with a p-value of 0.001 in their median of marked URLs.
Thus, the survey after group marked the URL significantly
more often than the survey before group. This result supports
H2.
Fig. 3: URLs marked before and after NoPhish
Hypothesis 3: This hypothesis deals with the comprehen-
7Note that we focused on the detection of phishing URLs rather than SSL.
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sion of the URL. Figure 4 indicates the identified marked areas
in the URL before and after playing NoPhish. This figure
indicates a shift of the participants’ focus. Afterwards domains
or parts of domains were marked in the majority of the cases.
Table I shows that hypothesis 3 mostly reveals positive ranks,
i.e. 18 of the 19 participant marked the domain or a part
of the domain (e.g. the part with a typo) more often after
playing NoPhish compared to the survey before. There is only
one participant where the amount of markings was the same
for the survey before as well as survey after (binding = 1).
Applying the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test we found
that the group survey before and the group survey after differ
significantly with a p-value of 0.001 in their median of marked
domains or marked parts of the domains. Thus, the survey after
group marked the domain or parts of the domain significantly
more often compared to the survey before group. This result
supports our hypothesis 3.
Fig. 4: Marked areas before and after NoPhish
Hypothesis 4: This hypothesis states that the usability of
NoPhish is above average, i.e. has a SUS score above 68.
Based on the answers in the SUS section, we computed a
SUS score of 83.7. This is considerably higher than 68 which
highlights the satisfaction of our participants with our app.
E. Further Findings
In addition to the elaboration on our hypotheses, we
conducted some further analyses regarding participants’ con-
fidence and their opinion about NoPhish.
Confidence: For each screenshot we asked the participants
how confident they were about their answers on both website-
surveys with a five-point Likert scale. Before playing NoPhish
only four of 19 participants stated a median confidence of five.
Afterwards, there were 15 out of 19 (thus eleven additional)
participants who indicated five in median. We ran a statistical
test to determine the statistical significance. We applied a two-
tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test again. We found out that the
answers in the before and in the after survey differ significantly
with a p-value of 0.001 in their median confidence. Thus, the
participants after playing NoPhish had a significantly higher
median confidence than before playing it.
Participant opinions: The general-survey after contained
statements which the participants had to assess with the aid of
a five-point Likert scale. The corresponding median answers
are:
• 5 for ’NoPhish helped me identify phishing websites
in future’
• 3.5 for ’I was motivated by the spoofed email to
continue playing the app’
• 3.5 for ’The amount of texts was appropriate’
• 5 for ’The text was easy to understand’
IV. RETENTION STUDY
We conducted a retention study (about five months later)
to determine how much participants are able to retain.
A. Hypotheses
To test and evaluate how well participants could retain the
knowledge they gained with NoPhish, we want to test the
following hypotheses wrt. correct answers.
Hypothesis 5 - Website-survey before (lab study) vs.
website-survey retention: In the retention study the participants
give significantly more correct answers when deciding whether
a website (i.e. the legitimate content and either the legitimate
or a spoofed URL in the address bar) is a phishing website or
not than before playing NoPhish.
Hypothesis 6 - Website-survey after (lab study) vs. website-
survey retention: In the retention study the participants do
not give significantly fewer correct answers when deciding
whether a website is a phishing website or not than directly
after playing NoPhish.
B. Study Design
The retention study was realized as an online survey. Every
participant who had participated in the lab study received an
email with the corresponding link. The online survey consisted
of mainly two parts which were:
(1) General Questions: The participants were asked general
questions regarding phishing, e.g. whether they received a
phishing email in the last few months. Furthermore, they were
asked whether NoPhish helped them identify phishing attacks.
(2) Phishing Survey: This part is similar to the survey parts
from the lab study: The participants saw screenshots of web-
sites (containing legitimate content and either the legitimate
or a spoofed URL in the address bar) in their Web browser.
In this survey, all 24 examples of the lab study are included.
Moreover, it contains ten new website screenshots of which
five represent phishing and the other five legitimate URLs.
Thus, the participants were confronted with 34 screenshots
in total. The participants were asked to reason their answers
for 16 websites, eight legitimate and eight phishing websites.
They were again asked to indicate their confidence about each
answer they gave.
C. Results for Hypotheses
In total 19 participants answered the follow-up retention
survey and are as such included in the following findings.
Measurements: The hypotheses 5 and 6 were tested simi-
larly to hypothesis 1 with the aid of the answers from the lab
and the retention study.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 were also tested with a two-tailed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test with the 19 participants from the
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website-survey before resp. after (playing NoPhish) and the
same participants from the website-survey retention. Table II
shows the scores for all participants for each study - before,
after, and retention. Table III summarizes the ranks of the
hypotheses which we discuss in detail in the following para-
graphs. Note, H5a in Table III considers a special case of H5.
TABLE II: Score per participant: before - after - retention
Participant % Before % After % Retention
1 56.25 95.83 67.65
2 62.5 87.5 91.18
3 62.5 95.83 73.53
4 81.25 100 97.06
5 62.5 91.67 79.41
6 50 95.83 76.47
7 68.75 91.67 97.06
8 56.25 91.67 82.35
9 81.25 91.67 73.53
10 50 79.17 76.47
11 62.5 91.67 100
12 50 91.67 82.35
13 50 66.67 61.76
14 75 95.83 82.35
15 68.75 95.83 76.47
16 31.25 83.33 70.59
17 37.5 91.67 94.12
18 25 91.67 73.53
19 56.25 95.83 100
Average 57.24 90.79 81.89
TABLE III: Ranks of hypotheses 5 and 6
Hypothesis H5 H5a H6
Negative rank 1 2 15
Positive rank 18 17 4
Binding 0 0 0
Total 19 19 19
Hypothesis 5: Figure 5 depicts the distribution of correct
answers for each of the surveys. Participants perform still
better than they did for the website-survey before.
Fig. 5: Correct answers lab and retention study
Table III shows that hypothesis 5 mostly reveals positive
ranks, i.e. 18 participant gave more correct answers for the
website-survey retention (five months after playing NoPhish)
compared to the website-survey before playing NoPhish. Only
one participant performed worse. Applying the two-tailed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test we found out that the group survey
before and the group survey retention differ significantly with
a p-value of 0.001 in their median of correctly answered ques-
tions. Participants gave significantly more correct answers in
the retention survey compared to the survey before they played
NoPhish. Thus, this result supports our hypothesis 5. Again,
we additionally applied the test while only considering new
URLs for the website-survey retention (cf. H5a in Table III).
The results show even if only new URLs are considered
the group survey before and the group survey retention still
differ significantly with a p-value of 0.001 in their median
of correctly answered questions. The participants also better
distinguish new phishing URLs from legitimate ones after
approximately five months compared to before they played
NoPhish.
Hypothesis 6: Figure 5 depicts the distribution of correct
answers for each of the surveys. Comparing the performance in
the retention study with the performance directly after playing
the app one can see that the participants’ performance has
decreased. This degradation is also revealed in the ranks of
Table III. 15 participants have a negative rank, i.e. they perform
worse in the website-survey retention compared to the website-
survey after. However, there are four participants who perform
better in the website-survey retention. Applying the two-tailed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test we found out that the group survey
after and the group survey retention differ significantly with
a p-value of 0.005 in their median of correctly answered
questions. The survey after group gave significantly more
correct answers compared to the survey retention group. Thus,
this result leads to the rejection of hypothesis 6.
D. Further Findings
This subsection deals with results from the additional
questions. Regarding the first two the results are:
• Eleven of 19 participants stated they detected a phish-
ing attack ever since.
• All of them except for one participant stated that the
NoPhish app played an important or very important
role for the ability to detect the phishing attack.
In all website-surveys we asked the participants how confi-
dent they were about each of their answer on a five-point Likert
scale. Figure 6 depicts the medians of the participants’ confi-
dence for all surveys (before, after, retention). Before playing
NoPhish, four participants stated (in median) a confidence level
of five. Immediately after playing NoPhish, there were 15
participants who stated five in median. One can clearly see that
the confidence decreased compared to the median confidence
indicated in the survey after. After five months only 13 (still
the majority) selected a confidence level of five in median.
Fig. 6: Median confidence for all studies
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V. DISCUSSION
This section discusses the results of the lab and retention
study. After discussing the results of the hypotheses, we
provide further insights into results for individual URLs to
deduce possible improvements for the app. Finally, we dwell
on the limitations of our study.
A. Discussion of Hypotheses
The results of both, the lab as well as the retention study
are very promising. However, there was a significant decrease
in performance when comparing the website-survey after with
the website-survey retention (H6). As this is not what we
expected, we discuss potential reasons that may have caused
this result. 1) Regression towards the mean: After playing
NoPhish the average score the participants achieved was about
90% (with 79% of the participants scoring 90% and higher).
About 37% of the participants even achieved about 95% or
higher. In case one or more persons’ performance decrease it
is very difficult to balance this degrading with much better
results than 90% as it is not possible to achieve more than
100%. 2) The exponential nature of forgetting: Ebbinghaus,
e.g. [15] found out that even after 20 minutes only 60% of
the newly gained knowledge can be recalled. After one day
only 34% and after 6 days only 23% can be recalled. As the
experiment conducted by Ebbinghaus was based on a sequence
of syllables the numbers might of course look different for
different situations, however, they give an indication of how
fast a human forgets learnt material. 3) Spacing effects: It is
easier to learn and remember learnt material when the material
is studied a couple of times spaced over a longer period of time
compared to studying new material repeatedly in a short time
span [15]. Thus, the retention of the participants might have
not decreased significantly if they were asked to repeat the
content in a spaced manner over a longer time period.
B. Analysis and Discussion of Results for Individual URLs
We start with the various phishing URLs and continue with
the legitimate ones. Figure 7 depicts the mistakes (in %) for
each website-survey and each spoofing trick covered in the
surveys. It distinguishes between those who completed the
level and those who did not. Note that level 1 and 2 are not
covered in the surveys: level 1 deals with the identification of
the domain and level 2 covered very obvious URL spoofing
tricks such as “amazon.phishing.com” which is why we did
not include it to the surveys.
IP address trick: Before playing NoPhish most participants
already recognized the IP address trick. After playing the app
and also in the retention study no participant fell for it.
Subdomain trick: All other URL spoofing trick types seem
to be a problem before playing NoPhish in some way, es-
pecially the subdomain trick. Directly after playing NoPhish
the participants’ performance increased (they made fewer
mistakes) for almost every URL spoofing trick including the
subdomain trick. However, after five months the subdomain
seems to be a problem again. Further analyzing the participants
who fell for the subdomain trick we found out that in the
website-survey before twelve participants fell at least for one
subdomain trick. In the website-survey after there were only
two participants who fell for at least one subdomain trick,
both fell for at least one subdomain trick in the website-survey
before already. One of these two participants completed only
level 3, meaning that he only learnt about the very obvious
subdomain trick like “amazon.phishing.com” and the IP ad-
dress trick. In the website-survey retention eight participants
fell for at least one subdomain trick. Both participants, who
already fell for subdomain trick(s) in the website-survey before
and after are represented there as well. Only one of these
remaining six participants had not made any mistakes for the
website-survey before or the website-survey after with respect
to subdomain tricks. All other five participants fell for at least
one subdomain trick in the website-survey before.
Letter swapping trick: An exception where participants did
not do better after NoPhish as well as in the retention study is
the letter swapping trick. The trick with the swapped letters is
a tricky problem as it is very difficult to detect it unless you
read the URL very carefully, even then it is likely to remain
undetected. An explanation for this phenomenon might be that
the order of letters does not matter because the human mind
does not read every single letter, but the word in a whole
instead [16], [17]. However, according to [18] scrambling
letters comes with a cost which depends on at which position
the letters are scrambled. It is worth mentioning that about
1.7% of all maliciously registered domains (note we do not
refer to the complete URL) contain the targeted brand name
in some form [12]. This tactic is not popular because usually
brand owners scan Internet zone files for their own brand
names. Even if 1.7% sounds not a lot, looking at the absolute
value 1.498 it is a reasonable number (not all of them include
the letter swapping).
Similar/deceptive domain trick: Analyzing the participants
who fell for the similar/deceptive domain tricks we found out
that in the website-survey after only one person fell for the
“paypal-secure.com” trick. This person had achieved level 7,
i.e. learnt about the similar/deceptive domain trick. This person
knew the provider PayPal, however, did not have an account
there. In the website-survey retention four participants fell for
this trick. The participant who fell for this trick in the website-
survey after did not fall for it in the website-survey retention,
i.e. all four participants are other participants. One person of
these four knows PayPal and also has an account there. This
participant did not fall for this trick in the website-survey
before as well as in the website-survey after. Thus, it is possible
the participant has overlooked it (due to lack of concentration).
Two participants who fell for this trick neither know PayPal
nor have an account at PayPal which means that it is possible
that these participants do just not know how the actual domain
of PayPal looks like. The fourth participant indicated that he
did not know PayPal but had an account there which seems to
be a mistake.
Legitimate URLs: Having a closer look at legitimate URLs
we can observe the following for the surveys: in the website-
survey before in average 4.59 legitimate websites were falsely
identified as phishing. As the participants had to assess eight
legitimate websites in total we can say that about 57% of
the legitimate websites were falsely rejected. It seems like the
participants were overcautious. Directly after playing NoPhish
the participants falsely rejected only 0.84 of twelve (7%)
legitimate websites in average. The participants seem to have
lost their fear and can distinguish legitimate websites from
phishing ones directly after playing the app. Finally, in the
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Fig. 7: Wrong answers for specific URL spoofing tricks
website-survey retention 3.47 of 17 (22%) legitimate websites
were falsely rejected. After five months the participants got
overcautious again, but still not as uncertain and overcautious
as in the website-survey before.
We further analyzed the explanations the participants gave
to their answers. Their answers indicate that the subdomain
in fact seems to be a problem. The participants seem to think
there is not supposed to be anything else but the domain in the
host part of a URL. Furthermore, they seem to be confused by
terms like “secure” occurring in the URL or subdomain. Thus,
there seems to be need for improvement in these aspects.
C. Limitations
Study limitations are discussed in this subsection.
Within-Subject Study Design: Within-subject deals better
with variability associated with individual differences com-
pared to between-group design, where different groups would
be considered who do and do not play NoPhish. A major draw-
back of the within-subject design, however, is the recognition
effect. The result of our study, however, shows that recognition
effects can be neglected (cf. subsection III-D).
Behavior Change: In the lab study the participants were
not in their usual environment. Therefore, they likely behaved
differently during the study [6], [19]. An alternative approach
would have been to distribute NoPhish to several participants
and ask them to play it remotely. However, this has two major
downsides: First, the participant would have been remote and
thus we would have less resp. no control over the conditions.
Second, testing the before and after app skills would have been
difficult to realize and to ensure a homogeneous process among
all participants.
Increased Attention: In both studies, the lab and the re-
tention study, the participants were told that the study dealt
with phishing. Additionally, they were explicitly asked to
indicate whether the websites were phishing websites or not.
Thus, the participants automatically increased their attention
towards answering these kinds of questions. Designing an in
situ study, where the participants would have been in their
usual environment and would have not known about their
participation, was not considered because such a design is
ethically questionable.
Changed Question: In the lab study the participants were
asked “Would you enter sensitive information on this website”.
In the retention study we asked “Is this website a phishing
website”. One could argue that this change might mean that
the results are not comparable. However, Figure 3 shows that
even before playing NoPhish participants based their decision
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on the URL in most cases already which indicates that they
looked for phishing indications and were not motivated by
personal reasons not to provide information on a website.
Domain Markings: There is a general issue with the ques-
tion for the test of H3 in the websites-surveys. In the website-
survey before we were not able to clearly ask the participants
to mark the domain when it was the reason for their decision
because we would have then pointed them towards looking at
the URL or even at the domain. This would have had an impact
on the results of H2. Since we could not formulate this question
clear-cut, a participant might have marked the complete URL
even if his decision was based on a part of it only (e.g. the
domain). Consequently, we are not able to clearly identify what
the participants’ main source of decision was in the website-
survey before when they marked the entire or several parts of
the URL. We were aware of this problem beforehand, but saw
no other option than formulating the question in such an open
form. After playing NoPhish the participants knew that they
were expected to mark the domain (due to level 1 and marking
of the Who-Section in case a phishing URL was detected in
NoPhish). This can be interpreted as a change of the question
even if the question did not change literally.
VI. IMPROVEMENTS FOR NoPhish 2.0
Despite the limitations of our studies we are confident that
we obtained a good insight into the effectiveness of NoPhish.
Here we present what we already changed in the app and what
we plan to change in future based on the study results and the
feedback we received.
Improvements based on the findings: Retention is crucial.
There seems to be some degree of retention, however, it is
necessary to repeat the learnt content over a longer time period
on a regular basis. In this form retention can and should be
optimized. NoPhish should be extended in such a way, that
it tests its user with a few questions after some time again
and again. It is important not to include too many questions
in order not to annoy users. This is part of future work.
Subdomain tricks were challenging in the retention study.
As in about 60% of the cases phishers exploit the brand name
by using it in some form in the URL, either in the subdomain or
in the path part [5], it is crucial to teach the users the difference.
We plan to extend the corresponding levels and include more
such examples in the exercises (while less obvious ones like
IP address tricks). Letter swapping was a challenge in both
studies. Currently, the letter swapping is explained in one level
together with the typo (generalized form of letter swapping)
and similar and deceptive domains. Considering the results for
letter swapping we plan to separate this URL spoofing trick to
an additional level and include more examples. Furthermore,
this type of trick could be visualized and explained in more
detail, e.g. by means of a complete text containing words and
sentences with swapped letters. Such a text would exepmlify
how diffiuclt it is to detect such scrabmled lettres.
Improvements based on participants’ remarks: Some par-
ticipants remarked that a couple of URLs referred to services
they did not know, even though we only used websites
of Alexa’s top rankings. Therefore, the current version of
NoPhish, always provides the information “You want to visit
the website of provider” in the exercise part before asking
whether it is a phishing URL or not. A few participants
mentioned issues with the positioning of some buttons which
we also improved in the current version of NoPhish. In every
introductory part of a level we briefly repeat the so far learned
parts of a URL (with a graphic) and the different URL
spoofing tricks the user has seen until this point. Some of
our participants explicitly indicated that our repetitions made
them feel more confident and safer. However we received some
personal feedback that the repetitions in the introductory parts
were too much and partially unnecessary as they just played
the previous levels. Thus, we adjusted NoPhish in such a way
that the screen for the repetition in the introductory block is
only displayed when a level is started from the main menu.
VII. RELATED WORK
We start with previous work on anti-phishing education.
Afterwards we proceed with related work in the area of secu-
rity education and awareness in general and their evaluation.
Anti-Phishing Phil [11] is a well-known anti-phishing
education game. The main character of the game is Phil.
Phishers try to trick Phil into eating their fake worms (phishing
URLs). For the reasons why we chose not to follow the
approach of Anti-Phishing Phil, we refer to [8]. To evalu-
ate the effectiveness of the game the authors conducted a
between-subjects experiment with three training conditions:
(1) existing training material, e.g. from eBay or Microsoft,
(2) anti-phishing tutorials created based on the game, and (3)
the game itself. Each group had to decide on ten websites (in
total 20) about their legitimacy before and after the training.
The results showed that the participants in the game condition
performed better than those in the other two conditions. Sheng
further analyzed the effectiveness of Anti-Phishing Phil in an
online study and also conducted a retention study for Anti-
Phishing Phil [20]. The participants were able to retain most
of the gained knowledge. However, the retention study was
conducted only seven days after the online study. We evaluate
the retention five month after playing NoPhish. This shows that
it is important to find out when repeating parts of the content
is necessary - maybe not after a week but definitively earlier
than five months.
Another proposal to educate users in protecting against
phishing is embedded learning [21], [22] where simulated
phishing emails with links to fake websites or malicious
attachments are sent to users. The moment a user falls for
a trap he receives a notification informing him that he could
have fallen for a real phishing attempt. This notification email
includes a link to a website with a training program and hints
on how to detect phishing and malicious attachments. This
approach was evaluated in [22]. In a first lab study the authors
compared its effectiveness with typical email security notices.
Their results suggest that the embedded learning approach is
more effective. A knowledge retention study was conducted
in a second lab study. They report no significant difference
between performances directly after the training and in the
retention study seven days later. This again shows that it is
important to find out when repeating parts of the content is
necessary.
Smith et al. [23] propose an awareness raising website
covering risks like phishing, spam or pop-ups. They evaluated
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the effectiveness. Participants reading the website material
seem to perform better in answering the corresponding quizzes
than participants who did not read the material. A retention
study was not conducted.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We developed an anti-phishing education app –NoPhish–
which educates the user to detect phishing URLs in a playful
manner. We evaluated NoPhish and received promising results
and also insights to aspects which could be further improved.
The participants performed significantly better directly after
playing NoPhish in all aspects: they gave significantly more
correct answers (15 of the 19 participants gave at least 90%
correct answers), they based their decision significantly more
often on the URL (after playing NoPhish 15 participants
always marked the URL) and they marked the domain or
parts of the domain significantly more often. We conducted
a retention study after five months because it is a crucial part
in security education: people are not confronted with attacks
on a daily basis. Thus, they do not apply their knowledge
regularly. Participants still performed significantly better than
before playing NoPhish. However, participants’ performance
decreased compared to immediately after playing NoPhish.
We identified the tricks of letter swapping as the most
difficult one (also immediately after playing NoPhish). While
future versions of NoPhish will focus more on this attack, we
also recommend that service providers search the web for do-
main names that match the own one while letters are swapped.
In addition, we noticed in the retention study, that subdomains
are an issue in both situations: corresponding phishing URLs
and legitimate URLs. Corresponding changes are planned to
be integrated in NoPhish to avoid confusion. Furthermore, we
plan to address the spacing effect by extending NoPhish in
such a way that users are tested on a regular basis over a
longer time span with a few examples. In future studies we plan
to address people from other age ranges, younger and older
than in these studies. We also want to compare NoPhish with
other training conditions such as Anti-Phishing Phil, reading
or video material and design a study which is closer to reality
to avoid the focus on security as primary task. Once finalized
NoPhish will be made available at the Google Play Store and
evaluated in particular regarding the necessary retention.
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